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Recent studies provide compelling evidence for the idea that creative thinking draws upon 
two kinds of processes linked to distinct physiological features, and stimulated under different 
conditions. In short, the fast system-I produces intuition whereas the slow and deliberate 
system-II produces reasoning. System-I can help see novel solutions and associations 
instantaneously, but is prone to error. System-II has other biases, but can help checking and 
modifying the system-I results. While thinking is the core business of science, the accepted 
ways of doing our work focus almost entirely on facilitating system-II. We discuss the role of 
system-I thinking in past scientific breakthroughs, and argue that scientific progress may be 
catalyzed by creating conditions for such associative intuitive thinking in our academic lives 
and in education. Unstructured socializing time, education for daring exploration, and 
cooperation with the arts are among the potential elements. As such activities may be looked 
upon as procrastination rather than work, deliberate effort is needed to counteract our 
systematic bias.  
 
For centuries, intuition and reasoning have been recognized as different elements of human 
thought(Glatzeder et al. 2011) but the work in this field long remained rather descriptive. Recently, 
however, there has been a surge of experimental work supporting the view that there are in fact two 
intimately linked yet distinct modes of thinking, fulfilling complementary roles in cognition (Baas 
et al. 2008, Morewedge and Kahneman 2010, Allen and Thomas 2011, Glatzeder et al. 2011). 
While there are many subtleties to the two ‘modes’, ‘processes’, or ‘systems’, most authors 
converge on the recognition of a dichotomy between them as well as on their main characteristics: 
System-I could be called intuition. It works largely unconsciously and relies on instantaneous 
underlying associations. System-II could be called reasoning and relies on the much slower process 
of reasoning. A compelling account of the strengths and weaknesses of the two modes is given by 
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman in his recent book ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’ (Kahneman 2011), 
showing among other things that we systematically overestimate the role of rationality (system-II) 
in our decision making. 
Here we will defend the perhaps provocative view that the way science and its institutions are 
organized reflects this overestimation of system-II thinking in producing scientific progress. We 
briefly summarize key insights from the rapidly unfolding field of cognitive science, and discuss 
how those could be used to rethink conditions for catalyzing scientific breakthrough. A short 
version of the argument we lay out has been published earlier as an opinion piece in PNAS 
(Scheffer 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The associative machine 
Although we still do not know how cognition works mechanistically in our brains, it has become 
clear that system-I may be characterized as an ‘associative machine’. Experiments reveal that ideas 
(a term used here broadly to include all kinds of concepts) are linked in our brain through a web of 
associations. For instance, ‘banana’ is linked to ‘fruit’, to ‘yellow’, to a taste etc.. Triggering one 
idea activates the associated ones causing decaying ripples of subsequent associations through the 
web. As coherent ideas mutually stimulate each other, there is positive feedback and a tendency for 
coherent sub-webs to be activated as a whole. 
 
A major breakthrough in research on this associative machine came with the development of tests 
that measure how easily persons retrieve ‘remote’ associations between concepts. High scores on 
such association and divergent thinking tests are often associated to ‘creativity’, a term reserved 
more precisely for the production of ideas that are not only original but also useful, thus excluding 
nonsense associations (Csikszentmihalyi 1999). The quantification of differences in associational 
capacity between persons allows the search for an underlying physiological basis. For instance, 
recent work has shown that persons that are good at divergent thinking tests, tend to have lower 
than normal dopamine-D2 receptor densities in their thalamus, suggesting that associative capacity 
is related to thalamocortical information flow (de Manzano et al. 2010). Interestingly, schizophrenia 
is linked to even lower thalamic D2 receptor densities, placing creative persons on a gradient 
between normal and schizophrenic individuals. This idea is reinforced by work showing that 
spontaneous eye-blink frequencies of individuals that score high on divergent thinking tests tend to 
fall between those of normal and schizophrenic persons (Chermahini and Hommel 2010). The latter 
group is plagued by a flow of bizarre associations. Assuming that the thalamus serves as part of a 
filtering system that keeps thought into a ‘box’ of relevant association, one could speculate that 
‘thinking outside the box might be facilitated by having a somewhat less intact box’ (de Manzano et 
al. 2010).   
 
The right state of mind 
Of interest from our current practical perspective is the finding that the same person can be better or 
worse at finding remote associations depending on her ‘state of mind’. For instance, a cheerful state 
(Baas et al. 2008) and mind-wandering(Schooler et al. 2011)  tend to be conductive to finding novel 
associations. Many everyday life observations fit with the idea that creative ideas come more easily 
 
 
 
 
under particular conditions. For instance, some people find that they get ideas especially under the 
shower or while walking. Perhaps the best-known example is Charles Darwin, who had a special 
thinking path, ‘the sandwalk’ where he used to walk round after round to promote his thought. Also, 
insights may appear in a mind that is dozing off. A famous example is the chemist August Kekulé 
who after thinking intensely about the seemingly insolvable question of what the structure of a 
benzene molecule could be, fell asleep in his chair at the fire place and woke up with the 
revolutionary idea of a circular structure linked to a dreamy vision of a snake biting its own tail 
(Gratzer 2004). The tremendous significance of such insights for science is illustrated by the 
reaction of the Nobel laureate in chemistry Adolf von Baeyer to Kekulés eureka findings, stating 
that he would have exchanged his lifetime’s accomplishments for this one insight Kekulé got from 
his dream (Gratzer 2004). This underlines the relevance of the question how the intuitive system-I 
thinking might be offered a more prominent place in scientific labor.  
 
Having the elements in place 
As associative capacity is influenced by the state of mind, an obvious element would be to 
deliberately plan moments of favorable conditions tailored to boost association. However, there is 
clearly another major aspect to consider: one can only associate between available elements. 
Darwin could generate his insights while walking, only because he had his mind loaded with a rich 
array of observations and ideas. Similarly, Kekulé got his dreamy strokes of insight only after long 
days of thinking about bits and pieces of the puzzle he tried to solve. As he recalled, he actually saw 
partial structures swirling around in his mind’s eye, as he dozed away before they finally fell into 
place (Gratzer 2004).  
These anecdotes also illustrate another relevant component when it comes to preparing the mind for 
novel associations: ‘priming’. Associations are made more readily between elements that have been 
(unconsciously) primed by recent thoughts or observations (Morewedge and Kahneman 2010, 
Kahneman 2011). For instance, subjects primed with the concepts of washing or dirtiness are more 
likely to complete the letter combination SO_P as SOAP, whereas priming with concepts related to 
food would more easily complete the ambiguous letter combination as SOUP. Clearly, the available 
set of ideas defines the playing ground for creative associations, but priming subsets may steer the 
mind to centers of gravity for such association. 
 
Balancing the dual thinking 
We have so far focused on the question how system-I could be stimulated. However, good science 
obviously needs a heavy contribution from the reasoning system-II, as the intuitions from system-I 
 
 
 
 
are all too often wrong in the hindsight. Recalling the definition of creativity as the generation of 
novel useful ideas, the best results are obtained by an intimate tango between the two systems, and 
there are many examples of well-known scientists that seem to have taken this approach almost 
deliberately. For example, as one of us (MS) discussed the ideas we expose here with Kenneth 
Arrow, the youngest winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics and known for several 
revolutionary contributions to the field afterwards, Arrow stated: “If you are not wrong two thirds 
of your time, you are not doing very well ; and if you are wrong you better find out yourself. Not 
only because it is more pleasant, but also because it helps you to learn”.  This reflects a remarkable 
similarity to the style of Richard Feynman, the extraordinarily innovative Nobel Laureate in 
physics. He was widely considered the most original mind of his generation (Gleick 2011). 
Feynman’s famously productive intuition was often wrong, and he did spend a substantial amount 
of time going down what later turned out to be dead ends (Gleick 2011). Only by balancing the 
intuitions by his  formidable system-II did Feynman create a series of breakthrough ideas in 
physics.  
 
Avoiding the islands of insight 
Feynman had a broad interest within and beyond science. However, despite his unbridled curiosity, 
he somehow deliberately tried to stay away from knowing previous explanations. He read little of 
the contemporary literature, and refused to follow the standard paths to which conventional 
mathematical notation would take him (Gleick 2011). The blinding effect of dogma was identified 
as a main inhibitor of scientific progress already in the 16th century by Baruch Spinoza. However, 
the forces that attract one to existing points of view are strong. One easily falls in love with a 
hypothesis, and such love is blinding when it comes to observations that fail to fall in harmony 
(Chamberlin 1897). In addition, it could be argued that the classical machinery of hypothesis testing 
and refining, tends to draw scientific enquiry into ever smaller circles around existing foci of 
interest, at the risk of creating islands of insight in a largely unexplored sea of ignorance. 
 
 
 
Enabling Dual Thinking 
The new insights in the machinery of cognition and the examples of scientific breakthrough 
thinking suggest some elements of an answer to our question, how scientists and scientific 
institutions might make best use of dual thinking. Of course Darwin, Kekulé and Feynman were 
 
 
 
 
exceptional minds, and our aim is not to ask how such minds and earth-shaking breakthroughs 
could be recreated. However, also on more modest scales, eureka moments are the sparks that 
catalyze many jumps in scientific insight. Importantly, such jumps may often imply that an 
association had been missing in scientific thinking, and a reshuffling of the world image was in fact 
overdue. The practical question we wish to address is: How could scientists and their institutions 
think of ways to promote such novel insightful associations, and thus allow for more frequent 
reorganizations of our scientific worldviews? We neither pretend to have anything close to a ‘silver 
bullet’ approach, nor wish to review the extensive literature on promoting creativity in general. 
Instead, we propose some ingredients that emerge from the material we presented, and (as science 
practitioners) make sense to us as elements worth considering when it comes to planning the 
everyday dynamics of science and education. 
 
Emptying time 
Generally accepted elements of ‘working’ in science are spending time behind a computer or the lab 
and having meetings in the office. Less easily accepted as productive work are activities such as 
dozing in an armchair or taking a stroll in the woods. But this perception may be wrong. Darwin’s 
deliberate walks and Kekulé’s naps resonate with the common experience that an insight in our 
work questions may often come outside the office rather than sitting behind a desk. Also, in our 
experience crucial discussions at meetings frequently happen on a walk with colleagues in the 
break. This suggests that it might be a good idea to deliberately plan substantial unstructured time 
and breaks to create moments of reflection. We could for instance set aside part of our working time 
for reflective walks, be it with colleagues and students or alone. Also at workshops planning say 
50% of informal reflection time might often be more productive than spending full days in the 
meeting room.  
 
Diversifying inputs  
While solitude is obviously crucial for the scientific mind to work, exposure is the other essential 
element. A large breakthrough in science often comes from a novel connection between existing but 
thus far isolated ideas. This can only happen in a mind that has been exposed to such remote lines of 
thought.  Indeed science historian Rogers Hollingsworth found that this is the case systematically 
for the kind of work that results in Nobel, Lasker or Crafoord prizes, stating that “Without any 
exceptions, over the past century the lead scientist on any major discovery has internalized a great 
deal of scientific diversity” (Whitfield 2008). Such diversity of information can be found in the 
literature and on the Internet. On the other hand informal discussions with people from other 
 
 
 
 
scientific backgrounds may put one on the track of an unexpected potential link. Much has been 
written about the conditions for such cross-disciplinarity to happen, and it turns out that ‘having a 
click’ on a personal level is essential, but also that encounters e.g. at informal places with food and 
drinks are often a starting point, suggesting that some social engineering might be less complicated 
than it seems (Whitfield 2008). Obviously, curiosity is a matter of attitude, and could be stimulated 
more in scientific education. As an antidote to a too focused curriculum we could use another quote 
from our conversation with Kenneth Arrow as a motto: “It is so far from anything I do, I must be 
interested”.   
 
The arts as a partner 
While connecting between remote branches of science is a somehow broadly accepted goal, the 
evidence we exposed suggests that we may want to pay more attention to facilitating the conditions 
that catalyze the process for remote ideas to actually fall into place, and to actively create the space 
for that. Also, it may be worth connecting in a more structural way to thinkers outside science. 
Research suggests that a randomly assembled group of people may often be better at solving 
complex problems than a selection of experts (Page 2008, Lorenz et al. 2011). This ‘wisdom of the 
crowds’ effect is due to the fact that experts tend to be good, but also relatively similar in their 
thinking and therefore less likely to cover the broad set of views one gets from a random and 
therefore more diverse group. 
 
A group that is focused on novelty and creativity but is also quite complementary to scientists are 
the artists. Some quotes from renown scientists, collected by Robert S. Root-Bernstein (Root-
Bernstein 2000)  may illustrate this science-arts complementarity. Mitchell Feigenbaum, the famous 
pioneer of chaos theory states: “It’s abundantly obvious that one doesn’t know the world about us in 
detail”. “What artists have accomplished is realizing there’s only a small amount of this stuff that’s 
important, and then seeing what it was. So they can do some of my research for me.” This is nicely 
complemented by the vision of C. S. Smith of MIT stating: “I have slowly come to realize that the 
analytic, quantitative approach I had been taught to regard as the only respectable one for a 
scientist is insufficient”.  “The richest aspects of any large and complicated system arise from 
factors that cannot be measured easily, if at all. For these, the artist’s approach, uncertain though 
it inevitably is, seems to find and convey more meaning.”  
 
Clearly, artists have a way of extracting meaningful aspects of the complex world around us that is 
quite complementary to what scientists tend to do, and may thus help map some of the ‘sea of 
 
 
 
 
ignorance’ when it comes to finding interesting input for our hypothesis testing machinery. Also, 
while training in Science is largely focused on skills reducing the risk of mistakes, training in arts 
often centers on ‘controlled risk taking’ as a means to stimulate innovation. Could Science do with 
some more of that? Certainly this would fit with the anecdotal observation that Richard Feynman 
spent much of his time venturing in dead alleys, and with the view of his fellow Nobel laureate 
Kenneth Arrow that a scientist is not doing very well if he is not wrong two thirds of the time. 
Perhaps we should use some of the education techniques from arts to boost adventurous exploration 
and ‘learning at the edge of chaos’ (Bertschinger and Natschläger 2004, Kleiman 2011)?  Certainly 
the provocative idea that a closer arts-science connection could catalyze breakthrough science 
(Gurnon et al. 2013),  is in line with the curious fact that  Nobel laureates are more likely to pursue 
artistic endeavours than are members of the Royal Society and National Academy of Sciences, who 
are in turn more artistically engaged than the ‘‘average’’ scientist (Root-Bernstein et al. 2008). 
 
The idea that mind wandering should be considered part of the scientific method, that we should 
educate for risk-taking exploration, or that arts may help the sciences, might well meet with 
skepticism in practice. However, the evidence is overwhelming that such seemingly irrelevant 
activities should not be seen as procrastination, but rather as effective ways to boost scientific 
productivity. 
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Fig. 1  The process of dual thinking as envisioned by the Norwegian artist Tone Bjordam 
(http://www.tonebjordam.com/ ). While the systematic reasoning process (system-II) depicted in the 
right-hand loop is emphasized in the way we teach science and organize our work, the associative 
left-hand loop (system-I) of the dual thinking process is usually hidden (Scheffer 2014). We argue 
that the working of this generator of novel ideas has always been essential for scientific 
breakthroughs and should be taught and catalyzed more explicitly in academia. 
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